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ABSTRACT—We propose a model of affective adaptation,
the processes whereby affective responses weaken after
one or more exposures to emotional events. Drawing on
previous research, our approach, represented by the ac-
ronym AREA, holds that people attend to self-relevant,
unexplained events, react emotionally to these events, ex-
plainorreachanunderstandingoftheevents,andthereby
adapt to the events (i.e., they attend less and have weaker
emotional reactions to them). We report tests of new pre-
dictions about people’s reactions to pleasurable events and
discuss the implications of the model for how people cope
with negative events, experience emotion in different cul-
tures, and other topics.
People often remark about how quickly the extraordinary becomes
commonplace.IthinkthateverytimeI’monamotorwayatnight,or
on a plane as it rises through cloud cover into sunlight. We are
highly adaptive creatures. The predictable becomes, by deﬁnition,
background, leaving the attention uncluttered, the better to deal
with the random or unexpected.
—McEwan, 1997, p. 141.
Sarah is thrilled when she learns that she won ﬁrst prize in a
ﬁction writing contest, but within a few days her pleasure fades.
Whenshethinksabouttheawardsheispleased,butnotasmuch
as when she ﬁrst learned that she had won. Sam is despondent
when Julie leaves him, but gradually his sadness eases. A year
later, he rarely thinks about Julie, and when he does he feels a
small twinge of sorrow but not the deep ache of despair. In ex-
amples such as these, people experience an intense affective
reaction to an event, but their reaction fades over time. They
have undergone affective adaptation, deﬁned as the psycholog-
ical processes that cause an affective response to weaken after
one or more exposures to a stimulus (Frederick & Loewenstein,
1999). In this article, we review previous explanations of
affectiveadaptationandproposeanewtheoreticalapproach.We
suggestthatpeopleattendandhaveaffectivereactionstoevents
that are self-relevant but poorly understood and that adaptation
occurs when they ‘‘explain away’’ these events—when they
transform them from extraordinary events that grab attention
intoordinaryeventsthatdonot.Thatis,whenpeopleunderstand
self-relevantevents,the‘‘extraordinarybecomescommonplace’’
and those events no longer elicit strong affective reactions.
The term adaptation has been used in many ways, thus we
should be clear about the phenomenon we are trying to explain.
In the literatures on learning and perception, adaptation refers
to how responsive an organism is to stimulation in the envi-
ronment. Sensory adaptation, for example, refers to physiolog-
ical changes in response to external stimulation (e.g., the
dilation and constriction of the pupil in response to varying
intensities of light). Habituation refers to a decrease in re-
sponsiveness after repeated stimulation, whereas sensitization
refers to an increase in responsiveness after repeated stimula-
tion. Learning theories that explain these phenomena focus on
low-level psychological and physiological processes that in-
volve little, if any, higher order mental processing (e.g., Groves
& Thompson, 1970).
Affective adaptation also involves the weakening of a re-
sponse after one or more exposures to a stimulus, but the pro-
cesses involved are likely to be more cognitive than they are for
sensory adaptation. The affective stimuli to which people adapt
aretypicallycomplexpsychologicaleventsratherthanobjective
properties of the environment (such as the intensity of light).
Thus, affective adaptation likely involves higher order mental
processes that alter the meaning of those events. In short, the
phenomenon of affective adaptation is similar to other forms of
adaptation, in that people’s responses to an event become
weaker over time. The explanation of affective adaptation,
however, is likely to be quite different.
What are those explanations? Three principles have emerged
from previous research. The antagonism principle holds that
affective reactions wane because they trigger both automatic
and conscious processes that antagonize them. For example,
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arousal that accompanies intense emotions (Boyce & Ellis,
2005; Sterling & Eyer, 1988), and opponent processes coun-
teractspeciﬁc emotions(Solomon,1980).Sarahmayexperience
substantialphysiologicalarousalwhenshelearnsthatshewona
covetedliteraryprize,andthisarousalmaytriggerphysiological
processes that calm her down. Other antagonistic processes are
under conscious control. After his breakup with Julie, Sam
might decide to watch television or drink alcohol to antagonize
his unwanted affective state (Eisenberg, Smith, Sadovsky, &
Spinrad, 2004; Gross, 2001; Hull & Slone, 2004; Larsen &
Prizmic, 2004; Ochsner & Gross, 2004; Taylor, 1991).
The reference point principle holds that events change the
reference point to which subsequent events are compared.
Adaptation level theories, for example, suggest that events
create an adaptation level and that subsequent occurrences of
these events trigger affective reactions only if they depart sig-
niﬁcantly from that level (e.g., Brickman & Campbell, 1971;
Helson, 1964; Parducci, 1995). Similarly, a central tenet of
prospecttheoryisthatchangesinstatesarethebearersofutility
and that ‘‘our perceptual apparatus is attuned to the evalua-
tion of changes or differences rather than to the evaluation of
absolute magnitudes’’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 277).
According to these approaches, each occurrence of an event is
compared with previous occurrences and elicits affect only if it
exceeds the standard set by those previous occurrences.
The attention principle holds that events have greater emo-
tional impact when people are attending to them (Kahneman,
Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Kahneman &
Thaler, in press; Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002).
Becausepeopletendtofocusonevents‘‘foralimitedtimeaftera
marked change in circumstances’’ (Kahneman et al., 2004,
p. 1779), the emotional impact of an event is dampened by
subsequenteventsthatdrawattentionawayfromit.Theextentto
which emotional events remain in focal attention, then, is a
critical determinant of the speed of affective adaptation. Often,
after an emotional event occurs, people engage in activities that
produce competing emotions and distract them from the event.
People who get back into the ‘‘swing of things’’ after the death of
a loved one, for example, may adapt more quickly than people
who do not, in part because they do not think as much about
their loss.
Although these three principles distill the wisdom of decades
of research on affective adaptation, no single theory integrates
them, and no principle alone provides a full explanation of the
phenomenon. For example, opponent process theory offers a
good explanation of people’s responses to physiological changes
to stimuli such as drugs (Koob, Caine, Parsons, Markou, &
Weiss, 1997), but it has been less successful in explaining
people’s responses to more complex psychological events
(Sandvik, Diener, & Larson, 1985). Adaptation-level theories
have been useful in explaining cases in which people explicitly
compare a current experience with a past one, but they provide
little guidance about how people will choose the particular
reference point to which that event will be compared (Brown,
1953; Diener, Lucas, & Scallon, 2006; Eiser, 1990; Frederick
& Loewenstein, 1999). In addition, norm theory (Kahneman &
Miller, 1986) suggests that people do not always compare an
experience with the past, and recent research has found that
people often do not have the attentional capacity to compare their
present experiences with alternatives and that they are more in-
ﬂuencedbythenatureoftheexperienceitselfthantheyanticipate
(Morewedge, Gilbert, Myrseth, & Wilson, 2008). The attention
principle captures a fundamental truth, namely that the affective
system is responsive to what is currently in the spotlight of at-
tention. However, no single theory explains what draws people’s
attention to an event in the ﬁrst place and what causes people to
shift their attention to other matters as time goes by.
THE AREA MODEL OF AFFECTIVE ADAPTATION
We offer a theory of affective adaptation that draws on some of
the key features of the three principles just described and ex-
pands on others. Our approach is represented by the acronym
AREA: attend, react, explain, and adapt. People attend to self-
relevant unexplained events; react emotionally to these events;
attempt to explain or understand these events; and, if they
succeed, adapt to the events inasmuch as they attend less to
them and have weaker affective reactions. Through these pro-
cesses, which are summarized in Figure 1, professional awards
and romantic breakups that are initially surprising and atten-
tion-grabbing come to seem perfectly understandable and
thereby trigger less intense affective reactions than they did
initially.
Identification/Categorization
(“What is it?”)
Unexplained self-
relevant events
(“It’s important but I
don’t understand it”)
Explained and/or not
self-relevant
(“It’s not important” or
“I understand it”)
ADAPT: No further
processing, lowered
accessibility of event,
weak affective reaction
REACT: Strong
affective reaction
ATTEND: Attention
allocated  Successful 
EXPLAIN:
Appraisals,
schema assimilation/
accommodation,
assessment of
implications,
significance
Fig. 1. The process of affective adaptation.
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The attention principle suggests that events have greater emo-
tional impact when people are attending to them. But to un-
derstand adaptation, we need to know what attracts people’s
attention to a particular event in the ﬁrst place. Research has
focused primarily on the roles of novelty, surprise, and the
emotional relevance of stimulus information. Although each of
these variables is inﬂuential, we suggest they are subservient to
a more general principle, namely that information that is self-
relevant, yet poorly understood, receives priority in attention
and memory (Allport & Postman, 1946; Malle & Knobe, 1997).
Variables such as novelty or surprise are inﬂuential because
they typically signal that an event is poorly understood.
A novel event is typically deﬁned as one that people have not
encountered before or that is distinctive due to the context,
whereas a surprising event is typically deﬁned as one that is un-
expected (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rescorla & Wagner,
1972). Both properties have been shown to attract attention, es-
peciallyinhighlyimpoverishedperceptualenvironmentsinwhich
people are presented only with a few letters, digits, or geometric
ﬁgures(asinmanyexperimentsonattention).Butineverydaylife,
people are constantly bombarded with a great deal of sensory in-
formation, and it would be maladaptive to orient to every novel
piece of it without regard to the importance of that information
(Ben-Shakhar, Asher, Poznansky-Levy, Asherowitz, & Lieblich,
1989; A.S. Bernstein,1969;Gray,Ambady,Lowenthal,& Deldin,
2004; Johnston, Miller, & Burleson, 1986; Maltzman, 1979).
Consequently, people screen out information that is irrelevant to
theirprocessinggoals(Donchin,1981;Kahneman,1973;Scherer,
2001a). In one study, for example, people in a virtual-reality en-
vironmentweremorelikelytodetectandorienttoastopsignatan
intersection than to one that was placed in the middle of a block
(Shinoda, Hayhoe, & Shrivastava, 2001). Although the sign in the
middle of the block was novel (people had probably never seen a
stop sign in such a location) and surprising (people did not expect
to seea stopsign there), it was not relevant to their goal of obeying
trafﬁc rules and avoiding collisions with vehicles in intersections.
Inthisstudy,then,theselfrelevanceofastimulustrumpednovelty
and surprise as a determinant of attention.
But the relevance of information does not by itself explain
what attracts attention. People analyze incoming information
with two questions in mind: ‘‘Is it important to me?’’ and, ‘‘Do I
understand it sufﬁciently?’’ If the event is deemed to be both
self-relevant and unexplained, people allocate attention to it,
and the event triggers an affective reaction. Conversely, if the
event is deemed to be either unimportant or sufﬁciently ex-
plained,peopledonotallocateattentiontoit,andtheeventdoes
not trigger an affective reaction.
1 This hypothesis, we should
note, is consistent with recent theorizing about the role of the
amygdala in information processing (M. Davis & Whalen, 2001;
Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Whalen, 1998). Whalen (1998), for
example, argued that ‘‘the amygdala modulates vigilance and
subsequent information processing in ambiguous, biologically
relevant learning situations’’ (p. 182).
Self-relevant, poorly understood events are also likely to be
highly accessible in memory and lead to intrusive thoughts
(Martin & Tesser, 1996; Wegner, 1994). For example, bereaved
people who have failed to make sense of their loss think about
theeventmore andrecoverlessquicklythan thosewhohave not
(Bonanno et al., 2002; C.G. Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson,
1998; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Pennebaker, 1997; Silver, Boon, &
Stones, 1983). Similarly, people have recurrent thoughts about
unresolved goals (see also Carver & Scheier, 1990; Martin &
Tesser, 1996). Savitsky, Medvec, and Gilovich (1997), for ex-
ample, showed that people are less likely to recall past actions
that they regret than inactions they regret, because people are
more likely to do cognitive work to make sense of the actions
rather than the inactions. Once people have done something
theyregret,theepisodeisoverandtheycanspendtimethinking
about it and coming to terms with it. An opportunity not taken is
more of an open book. People cannot know what would have
happened had they chosen to act, and because of this lack of
resolution, they are more likely to recall regrettable inactions
than regrettable actions.
Research on the Zeigarnik effect shows that people are more
likely to remember uncompleted tasks than completed ones
(Zeigarnik, 1935). But Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, and
Yaniv (1995) argue that both Zeigarnik’s research and their own
studies demonstrate that only uncompleted actions that are
particularlymeaningfultopeoplehaveamemorialadvantage.In
one experiment, people who worked on problems until they ei-
ther solved them or reached an impasse were more likely to
remember the unsolved problems. But people who were inter-
rupted by the experimenter before they reached a solution or an
impasse were less likely to remember the unsolved problems
(Seifertetal.,1995).Apparently,theperceivedinabilitytosolve
a problem makes it memorable, not the mere fact that it is un-
solved. In short, unexplained self-relevant events receive pri-
ority in attention and stand out in memory.
React
In addition to attracting attention, unexplained self-relevant
events trigger strong affective reactions. Indeed, an important
function of the emotional system is to signal people that some-
thing important is occurring in their environment that needs to
beunderstood(Mandler,1975,H.A.Simon,1967).Theideathat
self-relevance ampliﬁes affective reactions is incorporated in
most appraisal theories of emotion. Frijda’s (1988, 2007) law of
concern, for example, states that, ‘‘Emotions arise in response to
events that are important to the individual’s goals, motives, or
concerns’’ (1988, p. 351, emphasis in original). Scherer (2001a)
1Objects that are currently part of people’s mental imagery also attract attention
(Moores, Laiti, & Chelazzi, 2003; Pashler & Shiu, 1999). It may be that the attent-
ional system is biased to detect self-relevant events that are either poorly understood
or highly expected. It is the former events, however, that are likely to trigger intense
affective reactions and are thus most relevant to a model of affective adaptation.
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selected for further processing and appraisal. Research has
supported the idea that self-relevance intensiﬁes affective re-
sponses. Baldwin, Carrell, and Lopez (1990) ﬂashed subliminal
images of the Pope or a stranger, both with disapproving ex-
pressions, to Roman Catholic participants. Practicing Catholics
hadmore negativereactions whenseeingthePope thanthey did
when seeing the stranger. The pictures had no effect on non-
practicing Catholics, which is consistent with the idea that
stimulihighinself-relevancehave agreaterimpactthanstimuli
low in self-relevance.
As noted by Clore and Gasper (2000), the self-relevance of
goals is not an absolute but depends on the salience of com-
peting goals. For example, sporting events can trigger intense
emotionsinardentfanseventhoughtheoutcomeisnotnearlyas
important to them as many other things, such as their physical
well-beingandtheirchildren.Yet,whenfanswatchgames,their
other goals recede to the background. Similarly, people ab-
sorbed in a novel or movie can experience intense emotions
because, at that moment, they care about what happens to the
maincharacters.Bythesametoken,imagesofpeopleinanother
part of the world suffering from violence will trigger attention
and an emotional reaction, if people view the suffering as rele-
vant to their goal of wanting to live in world free of violence and
strife. Images of someone they know suffering from violence
would likely trigger an even stronger emotional reaction, be-
cause the suffering of people they know would be higher in self-
relevance than the suffering of strangers.
In addition to self-relevance, research shows that un-
expectedness and novelty amplify affective reactions (Mellers,
Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Ortony et al., 1988). Unexpected and
noveleventsincreasephysiologicalarousal(e.g.,Berlyne,1960;
Kahneman, 1973; Le Poire & Burgoon, 1996; Price & Geer,
1972),whichinturnintensiﬁesaffectivereactions (Schachter&
Singer,1962;Zillmann,1978).Consistentwiththisview,reward
pathways in the brain, such as dopaminergic neurons, are ac-
tivated not by the valence of a stimulus but by its lack of pre-
dictability (Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, & Montague, 2001;
Bevins,2001;Schultz,Dayan,&Montague,1997).And,itisnot
just human beings who respond to novelty. Bulls become bored
by the artiﬁcial ‘‘mating’’ device that collects their sperm, and
anything that makes the device novel rekindles the bulls’ in-
terest. One study found that even moving the device to a new
location—as little as 3 feet away—decreased the bulls’ time to
ejaculation by 84% (Hale & Almquist, 1960).
As argued earlier,however,unexpected andnovel events may
attract attention and intensify affective responses because they
aremoredifﬁculttoexplainthanareexpectedorfamiliarevents.
In general, it takes longer to explain events that are unexpected
or that have not been experienced before than ones that are
expectedorfamiliar.But,holdingsurpriseandnoveltyconstant,
eventscandifferintermsofhoweasytheyaretoexplain(e.g.,to
assimilate to our prior knowledge structures). Two people might
be equally surprised by the fact that a tornado has destroyed
their homes, but one might ﬁnd it easier to explain the de-
struction (e.g., ‘‘It was God’s will’’) and thus have a less intense
affectivereactiontoit.Inaddition,unexpectedandnovelevents
vary in their importance, and trivial ones are unlikely to trigger
affective reactions (e.g., a pattern of clouds never seen before).
We suggest that the same variables that cause shifts in attention
also intensify emotional experience, namely how self-relevant
and well-explained an event is.
Explain (Understand) and Adapt
When people attend to self-relevant events that are poorly un-
derstood and have affective reactions to those events, they at-
tempt to explain those events—not just in the sense of
determining their causes, but also in the broader sense of un-
derstanding the consequences of the events for their goals and
self-concept (Scherer, 2001a). If the process of explanation is
successful—people know what the event is, why it occurred,
how it ﬁts into their self-concepts, and what it means more
broadly—they have adapted to it. They do not think about the
event very often, and when they do, they have a relatively weak
affective response.
The ‘‘explain’’ part of our model is perhaps most open to
misinterpretation, thus we should be clear about what it entails.
As noted, we do not mean ‘‘explain’’ in the strict sense of causal
attribution, but in the broader sense captured by one of the
deﬁnitions in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary (1989): ‘‘to assign a
meaningto,statethemeaningorimportof;tointerpret.’’Wethus
use ‘‘explain’’ synonymously with ‘‘understanding the nature,
causes, and implications’’ of an event. The Oxford English
Dictionary goes on to say that to explain is ‘‘to explain away:t o
modify or do away with (a meaning, etc.) by explanation; to
explainsoastodepriveofforceorsigniﬁcance.’’Theﬁrstpartof
the deﬁnition describes the fact that people make sense of
events, andthe secondpartdescribesthe factthatmakingsense
of events reduces their signiﬁcance. Our deﬁnition of explain
includes both of these points: People exert cognitive effort to
determine the meaning and import of an event, and if
they succeed in doing so, the event is deprived of ‘‘force or
signiﬁcance.’’
The idea that human beings are skilled explainers of their
environment is certainly not new; it is a core feature of Piaget’s
theory of child development (Piaget, 1952; Piaget & Inhelder,
1969), attribution theories (Gilbert, 1998; Heider, 1958; Jones
& Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967), and appraisal theories of emotion
(Scherer,Schorr,&Johnstone,2001).Themost novel partofour
approach is that explanation leads to affective adaptation. Ap-
praisal theories of emotion, for example, have been concerned
primarily with the initial emotion people experience after ap-
praisinganevent andhave saidlittle about the duration ofthose
emotions (e.g., what causes them to fade over time; Frijda,
Mesquita, Sonnemans, & Van Goozen, 1991; Scherer, 2001b).
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tagonistic process responsible for adaptation.
For example, consider a college student who learns that
he failed a test. Upon hearing the news, he judges the self-
relevanceofthiseventandtriestounderstandit.Thepoorgrade
might be low in self-relevance because he already has an A
in the class and can drop his lowest test grade. Or he may have
a ready explanation for the event (he knows he has no aptitude
for basket weaving and didn’t study at all). If either of these
conditions is met, the student will think little about the test and
will have a relatively weak affective reaction to it. If the event is
self-relevant (e.g., the student needs to pass the course to
graduate) and is poorly understood (e.g., he studied hard and
thoughthehaddonewell),thenaniterative process ofattention,
reaction, and explanation is initiated, as shown in Figure 1. He
appraises the meaning of the event, invokes schemas to under-
stand it, and assesses its broader implications for his goals and
self-concept. If this attempt to understand the event is suc-
cessful, then the cycle is completed. The student no longer
thinks about the event, and when he does, his affective reaction
is relatively weak because the event is well understood. As this
exampleillustrates,explanationinducesaffectiveadaptationby
reducing the frequency with which people think about events
and the intensity of the affect they experience when they do.
Research on the hindsight bias, for example, ﬁnds that his-
torical upheavals, improbable outcomes of sporting events, and
sudden relationship break ups all seem, in retrospect, like
things that one should have anticipated (D.M. Bernstein,
Atance, Loftus, & Meltzoff, 2004; Carli, 1999; Fischhoff, 1975;
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Roese & Olson, 1996; Sanna &
Schwarz, 2003; Wasserman, Lempert, & Hastie, 1991). As soon
asaneventoccurs,peoplebegintoexplainitand,onceexplained,
the event seems more predictable (Pezzo, 2003). Although the
consequence of the hindsight bias for affective reactions to the
events has received little attention, we suggest that events that
come to seem predictable and explainable produce less intense
affective reactions than do those that initially seemed unlikely.
Similarly, an event that is yet to happen seems harder to explain
than one that has already occurred, suggesting that thoughts
about future events should evoke stronger affective reaction
than thoughts about past events. Recent research has conﬁrmed
this prediction (Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, in press; Van Boven
& Ashworth, 2007).
Explanatory Success and Failure
A key to understanding affective adaptation, then, is deter-
mining when attempts to explain emotional events succeed or
fail.Anumberofvariableshavebeenidentiﬁedthatfacilitateor
impede explanation.
Novelty. Asnotedearlier,themoreexperiencepeoplehavewith
an event, the more likely they are to understand it (Abelson &
Lalljee,1988).Apersonmustdosomeexplanatoryworktheﬁrst
timesheseesabeggarinfrontofherofﬁce(‘‘Isthispersonreally
in trouble? What will he do with the money if I give it to him?’’),
but not the 20th time. People have weaker affective reactions to
recurrences than occurrences because recurrences are already
understood.
Surprise. Also as noted, the more unexpected an event is, the
more difﬁculty people have explaining it. When people expect
an event to happen, they often do some of the explanatory work
in advance (Wilson, Wheatley, Kurtz, Dunn, & Gilbert, 2004).
Studies of bereavement, for example, have found that people
have more trouble adjusting to the sudden death of a loved one
thantothe deathofalovedonefromaterminal illness(Lehman,
Wortman, & Williams, 1987; O’Bryant, 1991).
Variability. Events never recur in precisely the same way, and
the more similar a recurrence is to the one before it, the less
explanatory work a person will have to do—and thus the less
intense his or her affective reaction will be. For example, du-
rable goods change relatively slowly over time, and thus the
experienceofusingahammertodaywillbeverymuchlikeitwas
last year. Other recurrences are more variable: Tonight’s dinner
at a local restaurant may be quite different from the dinner one
had there last year. This is partly a semantic issue of how nar-
rowly we deﬁne a category; ‘‘food,’’ for example, will vary more
overtimethanwill‘‘breadsticks.’’Nonetheless,someobjectsare
by nature more dynamic, either because they are vehicles for
novel experiences (e.g., television sets that allow people to see
ever-changingprograms)orbecausetheychangeovertime(e.g.,
otherpeople).Apersonwhohassuccessfullyexplainedanevent
in the past will need to do so again if the event’s recurrence is
signiﬁcantly different from its original occurrence, and this will
prolong the person’s affective reaction. Consistent with this
hypothesis, Van Boven and Gilovich (2003) found that positive
experiences such as vacations and meals at restaurants, which
arevariable,madepeoplehappierthanmaterialpurchasessuch
as clothing or computer equipment, which are stable—even
when the monetary value of the events and objects was held
constant.
Certainty. The less certain people are about the nature of an
event, the less likely they are to explain it. For example, people
adapt more quickly to news that they deﬁnitely have a serious
illness than to news that they might have a serious illness
(Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999) because they do not try to
explain events until they know precisely which event needs
explaining. The AREA model suggests that the same is true of
positive events. Uncertainty about positive events should de-
crease the likelihood that people will explain them, which
should produce a greater duration of pleasurable feelings. We
have found support for this prediction, as described later.
Explanatory coherence. A number of other factors make it
difﬁculttoconstructacoherentexplanationofanevent(Abelson
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Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Thagard, 1992, 2000). First,
people ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to explain an event if they do not
have a prior schema (or ‘‘explanatory prototype,’’see Abelson &
Lalljee, 1988) that accounts for the event. Second, the greater
the number of plausible explanations for an event, the more
difﬁculty people in have settling on any one of them. Third,
people prefer simple explanations to complex ones. Fourth,
peoplepreferexplanations withbreadththatexplainmoreofthe
evidence over narrow explanations that explain only a part of it
(Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Thagard, 2000). Events that
areeasytoexplaininthesewaysshouldhaveashorteremotional
impact than events that are more difﬁcult to explain.
Explanatory Content
All explanations are not equal. Attributing a bad grade to one’s
stupidity will produce a more negative affective reaction than
will attributing the same bad grade to the difﬁculty of the test.
Indeed, years of research on emotional appraisal have speciﬁed
howdifferentkindsofinterpretationsleadtodifferentemotional
experiences, such as joy, pride, anger, or remorse (e.g., Arnold,
1960; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman,
2001; Scherer, 2001b; Scherer et al., 2001; Weiner, 1985).
Researchonattributiontheory,suchastherevisedlearnedhelp-
lessness model (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), has
demonstrated that the particular way in which people explain
negative events (i.e., internal, stable, global attributions) pro-
duce negative affect of greater intensity and duration than do
other ways of explaining negative events (i.e., external, unsta-
ble, speciﬁc attributions). Some explanations make us feel
wonderful (‘‘I got an A on the quiz because I’m really smart’’),
others less so (‘‘I got an A on the quiz because it was really
easy’’).
The content of an explanation can inﬂuence the course of
adaptation in two ways, both predicted by the AREA model.
First, an explanation can determine the perceived self-rele-
vance of an event. Hannah might be initially pleased when she
ﬁnds out she got an A on a quiz, but after learning that the quiz
will have little impact on her ﬁnal course grade, the whole ep-
isode seems unimportant and her reaction fades quickly. Sec-
ond, when people do perceive an event to be self-relevant, their
initial explanation can determine how much additional cogni-
tive work is necessary to understand the larger implications of
the event. Two students might both attribute an A on an algebra
test to the fact that they are talented in math and feel joy and
pride as a result. One, who has done very well in all of her
previousmathcourses,alreadyhasa‘‘goodatmath’’schemaand
does not need to do further cognitive work to understand the
implications of the grade. Thus, she adapts quickly. The other,
who is experiencing success in math for the ﬁrst time, has to do
more cognitive work to alter her self-schemas and understand
the implications of her success for her goals and self-concept.
Consequently, she adapts more slowly. The same is true of
negative events: Adaptation will take a long time if a major
change in one’s self-schemas is necessary to understand the
event, which is likely when people attribute failure to low in-
telligence instead of bad luck.
A further implication of the AREA model is that any expla-
nation facilitates adaptation more than no explanation. People
who are uncertain whether they failed a test because of low in-
telligence or bad luck should take longer to adapt than people
who are certain that it was one or the other cause, because un-
certaintykeeps the event accessible in memory.Adaptation will
take longer for some explanations than for others, but people
have difﬁculty adapting if they have no idea why an event oc-
curred.Thisanalysisleadstonovelpredictionsabouttheeffects
of uncertainty on adaptation to positive events, which we will
discuss later in this article.
Finally, it is important to note that explaining and under-
standing a stimulus might lead to a reconstrual of it, as in the
case of acquired tastes. Novice wine tasters, for example, might
not be able to distinguish a 1996 Chateau Pichon Lalande
Pauillac from jug wine. After extensive training, the tasters
perceive things they did not before, such as ﬂavors of mulched
leaves and pencil shavings, and develop a strong preference for
the Pauillac. Similarly, someone reading a novel for the second
time might notice themes and illusions that he or she missed
before, thereby enjoying the novel more. These examples sug-
gest that under some circumstances, the process of explanation
feeds back to the process of identiﬁcation/categorization, es-
sentially restarting the process depicted in Figure 1.
HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
The AREA model makes predictions about the kinds of emo-
tional events people will adapt to most quickly, helps organize
the literature on coping with negative life events, makes
novel predictions about the duration of reactions to positive
events, and has implications for cultural differences in emo-
tional experience.
Explanation Speeds Recovery From Negative Events
Themore people understandnegative experiences,thelessthey
think about them and the less intense their affective reactions
are when they do. As Christopher Reeve, who became a quad-
riplegic after a horse riding accident, noted ‘‘It’s all part of the
random chaos of life, the question is how you make sense of it
afterward’’ (quoted in Adler, 1996, p. 52).
One source of evidence for this claim comes from the litera-
ture on how people cope with events that challenge their self-
esteem, such as receiving negative feedback at work, doing
poorly on a test, or being left by a lover. When such events
happen, people initiate strategies to minimize the emotional
effects of these events. These strategies include defense
mechanisms (Freud, 1924/1968; Vaillant, 2000), dissonance
Volume 3—Number 5 375
Timothy D. Wilson and Daniel T. Gilbertreduction (Aronson, 1968; Festinger, 1957), comparing oneself
favorably to others (Suls & Wheeler, 2000), afﬁrming oneself in
another domain (Steele, 1988), attributing negative outcomes to
external circumstances and positive outcomes to oneself (Me-
zulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004), afﬁrming one’s world
views to reduce concerns about mortality (Pyszczynski, Green-
berg,&Solomon,1999),andahostofotheresteem-maintenance
strategies (Dunning, 1999; Festinger, 1957; Folkman, 1984;
Greenwald, 1980; Kunda, 1990; Taylor, 1989; Tesser, 2000).
Thesestrategiesaresopervasivethattheycanbethoughtofas
a ‘‘psychological immune system’’ that detects and neutralizes
challenges to people’s sense of self-worth (Gilbert, Pinel, Wil-
son, Blumberg, &Wheatley,1998).Forall their differences,the
processes share the same goal, namely to reduce the negative
affect caused by threats to one’s self-esteem (Hart, Shaver, &
Goldenberg, 2005; Tesser, 2000, 2001). Many of the processes
can be thought as instances of explanation, inasmuch as people
revise their beliefs about the nature and causes of the event in
order to ameliorate its negative impact (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross,
& Gabrieli, 2002).Thus, when dealing with threats to one’s self-
esteem, people often construct explanations that deﬂect blame
from theself.When itisdifﬁculttoavoidself-blame,people can
lowertheperceivedself-relevanceoftheevent(e.g.,afterfailing
atestforwhichtheystudiedforhours,theycanconcludethatthe
topicneverreallyinterestedthemanyway).Onewayofreducing
dissonance, for example, is to trivialize an event and downplay
its self-relevance (L. Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). This
ﬁnding is consistent with our hypothesis that it is self-relevant,
poorly understood events that trigger attention and produce
intense affective reactions. Affective reactions will dissipate to
the extent that people succeed in understanding the event or
decide that it is no longer self-relevant.
The literature on coping also supports the idea that expla-
nation speeds recovery from negative events. The people who
recover most quickly from traumas, such as the deaths of loved
ones, are those who are able to ﬁnd meaning in the event
(Bonanno et al., 2002; C.G. Davis et al., 1998; Janoff-Bulman,
1992; Pennebaker, 1997; Silver et al., 1983). The particular
kind of meaning is, of course, important. If people are able to
generate explanations that maintain their view of the world as a
just place (Lerner, 1980), they are less likely to experience in-
trusive thoughts about the event. But even a negative explana-
tion of an event may be preferable to no explanation at all.
Evidence for this hypothesis comes from the medical litera-
tureongenetictesting (Baum,Friedman,&Zakowski,1997).In
one study, participants who had a parent with Huntington’s
disease took a genetic test to see if they had inherited the gene
that causes this fatal, adult-onset illness (Wiggins et al., 1992).
Participants learned either that there was a high likelihood that
they had inherited the Huntington’s gene, that there was a low
likelihood that they had inherited the gene, or that the test was
inconclusive. People who received the good news showed an
initial increasein psychological well-being,butafter 12 months
they had returned to their baseline levels of well-being. People
who received the bad news were initially upset, but after 12
monthstheytoohadreturnedtotheirbaselinelevelsandwereas
happyasthepeoplewhohadreceivedthegoodnews.Thepeople
who received inconclusive results and were thus in a continued
stateofuncertaintyabouttheirhealthwerethemostupset.After
12 months, they exhibited signiﬁcantly lower well-being than
did the people in the other two groups. One reason for this, we
suspect, is that these people thought about the disease more
often.
Studies by Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel (2005) illustrate some
of the conditions under which people are able to explain a
negative event and thus adapt to it. Participants recalled a
personalinteractionthathadmadethemfeelangerandhostility,
adopted an ‘‘immersed’’ or ‘‘distanced’’ perspective on the in-
teraction,andthenwroteabouthowtheyfeltorwhytheyfeltthat
way. People reported a substantial degree of negative affect,
except in the condition in which they both adopted a distanced
perspective and wrote about the reasons why they felt the way
theydid.Peopleinthisconditionwerethemostlikelytoachieve
an understanding of the experience; that is, they were most
likely to ‘‘make sense of the past’’ and ‘‘understand the causes
underlying the event’’ (Kross et al., 2005, p. 713). Further, the
degree to which people achieved an understanding of the event
signiﬁcantly mediated the reduction in negative affect they ex-
perienced.
Helping people develop explanations is an integral part of
many psychotherapeutic approaches, and some types of psy-
chotherapyareexplicitlydesignedtohelppeopleintegratetheir
experiences into their knowledge structures. For example,
cognitive processing therapy is designed to help people who
have been sexually assaulted identify the ways in which their
trauma conﬂicts with their prior knowledge structures and to
help them develop new knowledge structures that provide
healthier ways of understanding the trauma (Resick, Nishith,
Weaver, Astin, & Feuer, 2002; Resick & Schnicke, 1992). More
generally, research has found that different kinds of psycho-
therapy are equally effective in the treatment of psychological
disorders such as depression (Ablon & Jones, 1999; Miller &
Berman, 1983; Sloane, Staples, Cristol, Yorkston, & Whipple,
1975; Smith, Glass, & Miller, 1980; Stiles, Shapiro, & Elliott,
1986),andthekeycommoningredientmaybehelpingpeopleto
achieve acoherent explanation oftheir problems.One study,for
example, found that the extent to which depressed clients
adopted anew beliefsystem advocatedbythe therapistswasthe
best predictor of successful outcomes, even though the thera-
pists were using quite different therapeutic approaches (Ablon
& Jones, 1999, 2002; see also Kelly, 1990; Sloane et al., 1975).
The interactions between therapist and client are undeniably
complex, and the success of therapy depends on many factors,
including the precise symptoms and disorders being treated
(Westen, Novotny, & Thompson-Brenner, 2004). But very
differenttherapeuticapproacheshavebeneﬁcialeffects,andthe
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development of a new, healthier narrative to explain his or her
life and problems (Wilson, 2002).
Explanation Speeds Recovery From Positive Events
The more quickly people reach an understanding of negative
events,thesoonertheyrecover fromthem.Virtuallyallprevious
approaches predict that explanation will make people feel bet-
ter, regardless of whether the event they are explaining is pos-
itive or negative. Theories of meaning making, for example,
argue that people have a need for certainty that compels them to
understand themselves and the external environment and that
uncertainty is a source of threat (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006;
Kruglanski&Webster,1996; Pyszczynski,Greenberg, &Koole,
2004; Sorrentino & Roney, 2000; van den Bos, 2004). Indeed,
human beings have a strong proclivity to understand, predict,
and control their environments, and a failure to do so is often
aversive. Virtually all tests of these hypotheses, however, have
examinedpeople’sunderstandingofnegativeevents.TheAREA
model is unique in predicting that explanation also leads to the
diminution of affective reactions to positive events.
We predict that anything that impedes explanation—such as
uncertainty—should prolong affective reactions to positive
events. To test this pleasure of uncertainty hypothesis, Wilson,
Centerbar,Kermer,andGilbert(2005)manipulatedhow certain
people were about the nature of positive events. As predicted,
people in the uncertain conditions had more long-lasting posi-
tive reactions. In one study, for example, people watched an
abridged version of the movie Rudy (Anspaugh, 1993), which is
based on the true story of a man who fulﬁlls his life dream of
playing football at Notre Dame University. After viewing this
upbeatﬁlm,allparticipantsreadtwoaccountsofwhathappened
to Rudy in real life after he graduated from college. These
accounts were pretested to be equally positive, though they
differed in their details; in one, Rudy remained in the Midwest
and raised a family, and in the other he moved to New York and
became a community speaker. In the certain condition, partic-
ipants were told which version (either the family man or
community speaker version, counterbalanced) was true. In the
uncertain condition, participants were told that one version
described Rudy and the other described one of his teammates,
but it was unclear which version described which person. All
participants rated their mood, worked on a ﬁller task for 5 min,
and rated their mood again.
As seen in Figure 2, people in both conditions reported a
relativelypositivemoodrightafterseeingthemovieandreading
the two versions of Rudy’s life story. Over the next few minutes,
however, people who did not know which of the two stories was
true felt better than did the people who did know. Why did
this happen? Once people knew which story was true, they
presumably started to explain it by connecting that story with
what they knew about Rudy and making the entire narrative
understandable. As a result, their thoughts moved on to other
matters, such as what they planned to do later that day. People
who did not know which story was true could not as easily make
sense of Rudy’s life, and thus they were more likely to dwell on
the movie and the positive feelings it produced. Consistent with
this interpretation, people in the uncertain condition reported
havingthoughtaboutthedescriptionsofRudy’slifesigniﬁcantly
more than did the people in the certain condition.
Wilson et al. (2005) replicated these results with different
manipulations of mood and uncertainty. In one study, college
students read text messages from three opposite-sex students
who had evaluated them positively. People who were uncertain
about which student had authored each message remained in a
positive mood longer than did the people who knew which stu-
dent had authored each message. In a ﬁeld study, participants
studying in the library were given an index card with a dollar
coin attached to it. In the uncertain condition, the text on the
card conveyed vague information about the source and purpose
of the money, such as ‘‘The Smile Society,’’ ‘‘A Student/Com-
munity Secular Alliance,’’ and ‘‘We Like To Promote Random
ActsofKindness.’’Inthecertaincondition,thetextonthecards
was identical except that a question preceded each piece of
information, namely ‘‘Who are we?’’ and ‘‘Why do we do this?’’
Although these questions provided no additional information,
Wilson et al. (2005) hypothesized that the familiar question-
and-answerformatwouldappeartoexplainthesourceofthegift
andwhyitwasbeinggiven(Langer,Blank,&Chanowitz,1978),
making it easier for people to feel that they had explained the
gift. Consistent with this hypothesis, Wilson et al. (2005) found
that when the participants were approached by a second
experimenter 5 min later and asked to complete a brief survey,
the people who had received the ‘‘certain’’ card reported a less
positive mood than did those who had received the ‘‘uncertain’’
card.
These studies highlight a pleasure paradox, which refers to
the fact that people have two fundamental motives—to under-
stand the world and to maintain positive emotions—that are
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Fig. 2. Reportedmoodasafunctionoftimeanduncertaintyaboutwhich
account of the movie character was true. Means are ratings of how happy,
pleased, and cheerful people felt on a 21-point scale. Higher numbers
reﬂect a more positive mood. Adapted from Wilson et al. (2005).
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powerful motive and is critical to reexperiencing positive
events. When a college professor gives an unusually good lec-
ture,forexample,keepingherstudentsontheedgeoftheirseats
for the entire hour, it is to her advantage to understand why she
was soeffectiveso thatshe canbe asspellbindingthe next time.
The more she analyzes and understands her performance,
however,thelessextraordinaryitwillseemandthelesspleasure
she will derive from it. John Keats recognized this fact, sug-
gesting that aperson of‘‘achievement’’isone who is‘‘capable of
being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable
reaching after fact & reason’’ (Bush, 1959, p. 261).
The most direct evidence for the pleasure of uncertainty hy-
pothesiscomesfromastudyinwhichpeoplesawclipsofmovies
thatelicitedpositiveaffectandwereprimedwiththoughtsabout
uncertainty or certainty (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008).
Ostensiblyaspartofastudyondistractionwhilewatchingﬁlms,
participants were asked to repeat certain phrases while watch-
ingbriefmovieclips.Theclipsportrayedpositiveevents,though
the story behind the events was not clear (e.g., one was scene
from Chariots of Fire in which a man wins a running race).
Participants repeated phrases connoting uncertainty (‘‘I won-
der,’’ ‘‘huh?’’, ‘‘I don’t get it’’) or phrases connoting certainty (‘‘I
see,’’ ‘‘that makes sense,’’ ‘‘of course’’). As predicted, partici-
pants reported more positive feelings toward the clip when they
uttered the uncertain phrases. A separate group of participants,
who rated the positivity of the phrases, found the uncertain
phrases to be more negative than the certain ones, suggesting
that the results of the main study were not due to classical
conditioning.Rather,repeatingtheuncertainphrasesappearsto
have made people more curious about the ﬁlm and thereby in-
creased their enjoyment of it.
The AREA model makes other counterintuitive predictions.
Forexample,itsuggeststhatunder someconditions,people will
be happier receiving one desirable gift than two. Kurtz, Wilson,
and Gilbert (2007) asked college students to rate their prefer-
ence for several gifts, such as a box of chocolates, a disposable
camera, and a coffee mug. Participants then learned that they
would receive (a) one of their two favorites and were told which
one it would be (one gift/certain condition), (b) one of their two
favorites but were not told which one until the end of the study
(one gift/uncertain condition), or (c) both of their favorites (two
gifts/certain condition). As predicted, people in the one gift/
uncertain condition remained in a good mood for the longest
period of time. When people knew which gift(s) they would re-
ceive,theycouldmakesenseofit(e.g.,‘‘ohnice,thecamera,I’ll
take pictures of my roommate later’’), thus reducing the need to
thinkabout itfurther.Whenpeopledidnotknowwhichgift they
would receive, the sense-making process was held in abeyance,
making thoughts about the gifts more accesible. In keeping with
this prediction, the researchers found that people in the un-
certain condition spent the longest time looking at photographs
of the gifts when they were displayed on a computer.
In the Wilson et al. (2005) and Kurtz et al. (2007) studies,
people knew that a positive outcome had occurred (e.g., Rudy’s
life turned out well, they received positive feedback from their
peers, they received a dollar, they received one of their favorite
gifts), but they were uncertain about which positive outcome or
aboutwhyithadhappened.Butpeopleareoftenuncertainabout
whether an outcome will be good or bad. People make marriage
proposals without being certain about whether they will be ac-
cepted and interview for jobs with no guarantee that they willbe
offered a position. According to the AREA model, uncertainty
increases the accessibility of thoughts about an event and the
intensity of one’s reactions to them. Thus, a key question con-
cerns the valence of thoughts that remain accessible. Because
the events were unambiguously positive in the Wilson et al.
(2005) and Kurtz et al. (2007) studies, the uncertainty manip-
ulations were hypothesized to increase the accessibility of
positive thoughts, thereby prolonging people’s good moods. But
whenthevalenceofanoutcomeisuncertain—suchaswhethera
marriage proposal will be accepted—people’s thoughts should
vacillate between the positive (‘‘she might say yes!’’) and
the negative (‘‘but she might choose Harry over me’’). Under
these conditions, uncertainty should thus have mixed or even
negativeeffectsonpeople’saffectbecauseitshouldincreasethe
accessibility of negative thoughts.
Suppose, however, that people are fairly certain that an out-
come will be positive but that some degree of uncertainty re-
mains (e.g., there is a 70% chance they will receive a prize).
Common sense (and expected utility theory) suggests that peo-
ple who are 70% certain that a good outcome will occur should
be less happy than people who are 100% certain. According to
theAREAmodel,however,thoughtsabouttheprizewillbemore
accessible to people in the 70% condition, and the key is
whetherthesethoughtsarepositiveornegative.Ifthealternative
to the positive outcome is neutral rather than negative, some
uncertainty about the outcome might result in an increased
accessibility of positive thoughts. Thus, if people are 70% cer-
tainthattheywillwinaprizeandthealternativeisthestatusquo
(nothavingaprize),theymayfocusonthepossibilityofwinning,
thus prolonging positive feelings. If people are 70% certain that
theywillwinaprizeandthealternativeisnegative(e.g.,losinga
large sum of money), they may focus on the possibility of losing,
thus prolonging negative feelings.
Whitchurch, Wilson, and Gilbert (2008) performed an initial
test of this hypothesis to see if there are circumstances under
which uncertainty about a positive outcome is more pleasurable
than certainty. Participants took a saliva test to detect the pos-
sible presence of a newly discovered (actually ﬁctitious) rare
hormone that helps people work under pressure and confers an
advantage in academic and professional settings. People in the
certain condition learned that they deﬁnitely had the hormone,
people in the uncertain condition learned that the test was
positive for the hormone but that it was only 70% reliable, and
people inthe control condition didnotreceiveanyfeedback. As
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positive mood than were people in the other two conditions.
Whitchurch et al. also predicted that people in the uncertain
condition would be more distracted while subsequently listen-
ing to a segment of a book on tape because they were continuing
to think about the hormone test. In fact, people in the uncertain
condition did signiﬁcantly less well on a recall task about the
segment than did people in the certain or control conditions.
Thisstudyprovidespreliminaryevidenceforthehypothesisthat
uncertainty about whether a positive outcome has occurred can
be more pleasurable than certainty, a prediction that is unique to
the AREA model. To be sure, several questions remain: What
degree of uncertainty is necessary to get this effect (e.g., would it
occurifpeoplewere50%certainthattheyhadthehormone?),and
woulditoccurifthealternativewerenegative(e.g.,thattheyhada
hormone with negative effects) rather than relatively neutral (e.g.,
that they did not have a rare positive hormone)?
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The AREA model explains a wide range of ﬁndings in the lit-
erature on emotional reactions to negative events and it makes
uniquepredictionsaboutemotionalreactions topositiveevents,
manyofwhichhave been conﬁrmed.Themodelraises anumber
of additional questions that we will now discuss brieﬂy.
To What Kinds of Events Do People Adapt Most Quickly?
There has been a great deal of research on affective adaptation
conducted in speciﬁc domains on such topics as the speed with
which people adapt to the death of loved ones (Stroebe &
Hansson, 2001), debilitating diseases (e.g., Baron et al., 2003;
Lacey et al., 2004; Lucas, 2007); incarceration (e.g. Zamble,
1992), noise (e.g., Cohen & Weinstein, 1981), unemployment
(Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2004), divorce (Lucas,
2005), and, on the positive side, marriage (e.g., Lucas, Clark,
Georgellis, & Diener, 2003), increases in income (Diener &
Biswas–Diener, 2002), and winning lotteries (e.g., Brickman,
Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978). Reviewers of these literatures
have observed that people appear to adapt more easily in some
domains than they do in others; for example, Frederick and
Loewenstein (1999) noted that people adapt more easily to in-
carceration than to unpleasant noises, and Lucas et al. (2004)
foundthatlosingone’sjobisparticularlydifﬁculttoadapttoand
has a long-term impact on life satisfaction.
The AREA model provides at least a partial answer as to why
this is: The more easily one can explain and understand an
event, the more quickly one will adapt to it. Examining the
conditionsthatpromoteorinhibitexplanationhelpsexplainwhy
people adapt more quickly to some kinds of events than others.
We illustrate this point by discussing research on noise.
Several studies have found that people do not adapt to the
negative effects of noise (Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999).
Weinstein (1982), for example, interviewed people 4 and 16
months after a noisy highway opened near their home. Contrary
to an adaptation prediction, there was no reduction over time in
ratings of how distracting and annoying the noise was. In fact,
there was a small but signiﬁcant increase in these ratings over
time. Similar results were found in a study that compared chil-
drenwhoattendedschoolsnearanoisyairportwithchildrenwho
attended quiet schools. The children who attended the noisy
schools exhibited deﬁcits on cognitive, motivational, and
physiological measures, and there was little evidence that these
deﬁcits decreased over time (Cohen, Evans, Krantz, Stokols, &
Kelly, 1981).
Noise from highways and airports, we suggest, meet the con-
ditions that make an event difﬁcult to adapt to, such as vari-
abilityandthelackofpredictability.Thetypesofnoisevaryover
time (e.g., the loud roar of an 18-wheeler driving by at 70 miles
an hour vs. cars honking), and these noises occur at unpre-
dictable times. Such noises would probably be less annoying if
theywerealwaysthesameandoccurredatset,predictabletimes
(e.g., if trucks always came at the hour and half hour). It is also
possible, of course, that when noises get above a certain decibel
level they attract attention, regardless of how predictable or
familiar they are. Workers on an airport tarmac are unlikely to
avoid noticing the 120-dB sound of a jet taking off, even if they
have experienced this sound hundreds of times before. None-
theless, the predictability, novelty, variability, and ease of ex-
plaining the sound should make a difference. Tarmac workers
would likely attend and react more to an unexpected, difﬁcult-
to-explain 120-dB noise (e.g., live rock music coming from the
runway) than to the sound of yet another jet taking off.
As these examples illustrate, there may not be anything in-
trinsic about noise that makes it difﬁcult to adapt to; rather, the
question is whether noise meets the conditions that attract at-
tention and defy explanation. People may well adapt to sounds
thatarepredictable,havebeenheardmanytimesbefore,change
littlefromonetimetothenext,andareeasilyassimilatedtotheir
prior schemas, such as the sound of a clock ticking or the
noontimewhistleatafactory.Inlinewiththisreasoning,several
studies have found that people adapt quickly to noises that are
predictable (Cohen & Weinstein, 1981; Kjellberg, Landstrom,
Tesarz, Soderberg, & Akerlund, 1996) or familiar (Broadbent,
1979; Cohen & Weinstein, 1981).
Thisanalysissuggestswhycellphoneconversationscanbeso
annoying. We automatically try to understand the conversation
but have difﬁculty doing so, because we only hear one side of it.
Ifpeople could hearboth sidesofthe conversation—asthey can
when hearing two people chatting on a bus, for example—they
could more easily tune it out. In most instances, they would
determine that the conversation was not important to them and
would succeed in ignoring it. Previous research has supported
this hypothesis (Monk, Carroll, Parker, & Blythe, 2004). People
who overheard a stranger speaking on a cell phone rated the
conversation as more annoying and difﬁcult to ignore than did
people who heard both sides of the same conversation.
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We have used the term affective reactions broadly to refer to
people’s valenced reactions to events. The AREA model helps
explain the time course of different kinds of affective reac-
tions—namely, emotions versus moods. The chief difference
between emotions and mood is that the former are attributed to
speciﬁc objects and the latter are not (Clore & Gasper, 2000).
A person who attributes her negative affect to the fact that her
goldﬁsh has died will feel the emotion of sadness, whereas a
person who has negative affect but is not sure why will be in a
more generalized negative mood. Clore and Gasper (2000)
suggest that the more unconstrained negative affect is (that is,
thelessitisattributedtoaspeciﬁcsource),thelongeritwilllast,
which is consistent with our theorizing. Once the person attri-
butes her sadness to the goldﬁsh, she can begin to achieve an
understanding and explanation of the event (e.g., "Goldy had a
fulllife,andIguessitwashistime"),leadingtoanattenuationof
the sadness. When she has no idea why she feels the way she
does, the negative affect will last longer and is likely to be at-
tached to a broader array of events in her life. The AREA model
also helps explain why some speciﬁc emotions last longer than
others, a topic that has not received much attention in the
emotion literature (Frijda et al., 1991; Scherer, 2001b). Some
affective states, such as depression or irritability, are more akin
to moods, in that they are not attributed to a single object. As
discussed earlier, this fact may help explain why these states
tend to last longer than do those attributed to speciﬁc causes.
Cultural Differences in Affective Experience
The AREA model predicts that the more easily people can ex-
plain events, the shorter the duration of their affective reactions
to them. This prediction is interesting to consider in light of
evidence that members of East Asian cultures have a different
explanatory style than do members of Western cultures. East
Asians tend to reason holistically, taking into account both ob-
jectsandthecontextinwhichtheyareembedded.Theyaremore
likely to engage in dialectical reasoning, which allows for and
explains apparent contradictions. Westerners are more likely to
think analytically, paying more attention to the object of atten-
tion and less to the surrounding context, and to prefer one ex-
planation while rejecting competing ones (Nisbett, 2003;
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).
One implication of these different systems of thought is that
East Asians might be less likely to experience surprise when
they encounter evidence that is inconsistent with their expec-
tations.Becausecontradictions are more easily accounted forin
a system of dialectic thought, they can assimilate the new in-
formation into their belief system, even if that information is
inconsistent with their prior expectations. Choi and Nisbett
(2000) found support for this hypothesis in studies of American
and Korean college students. When given information that di-
rectly contradicted their initial hypotheses, Koreans expressed
signiﬁcantlylesssurprisethandidAmericans.Further,Koreans
showed a stronger hindsight bias than did the Americans,
overestimating how predictable the outcome was in advance,
once they knew it.
Because explanation reduces the intensity and duration of
affective reactions, the AREA model predicts that East Asians
should have shorter and less intense affective reactions to un-
expected events than do Westerners. An unexpected event is
likely to seem surprising to a Westerner and will require more
work to explain and thus have a relatively large emotional im-
pact. The same event is likely to seem unsurprising and pre-
dictable to an East Asian and thus have less of an emotional
impact. Support for this hypothesis was found in a study by
Mesquita and Karasawa (2002), in which American and Japa-
nese college students completed questionnaires about their
emotions four times a day for a week. Unlike most studies of this
type, the students were given the option to report that they had
not experienced any emotion during the previous few hours. As
the AREA model predicts, the Japanese college students were
signiﬁcantly more likely to choose this option than were the
American college students. In another study, Chinese-American
and European-American couples watched a videotape of a dis-
cussion they had just had with their partner about an area of
conﬂict and made continuous ratings of how they had felt during
the interaction on a dial that ranged from extremely negative to
neutral to extremely positive (Tsai & Levenson, 1997). The Chi-
nese-American couples showed signiﬁcantly less variability in
these affect ratings than did the European-American couples,
whichisconsistentwiththehypothesisthatEastAsianshaveless
intense and shorter affective emotional reactions than Western-
ers do. Other studies have found evidence that this hypothesis is
true for positive emotions but not for negative emotions; for ex-
ample, Scollon, Diener, Oishi, and Biswas-Diener (2004) found
that Asian-American and Japanese college students reported
signiﬁcantlylessfrequentandlessintensepositiveemotionsover
the course of a week than did European-American college stu-
dents. However, there were no signiﬁcant differences between
these groups in the frequency or intensity of negative emotions
(see also Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000).
Cultural inﬂuences on emotional experience are undoubtedly
complex and involve factors other than explanation, such as the
tendency for European Americans to emphasize positive emo-
tions over negative ones, the tendency for Asians to emphasize
emotions that involve engagement with others, and the tendency
for cultural differences to occur more often in social than non-
social contexts (Kitayama et al., 2000; Tsai, Chentsova-Dutton,
Freire-Bebeau, & Przymus, 2002). The AREA model suggests
thattheeaseandspeedwithwhichpeoplecanexplainsurprising
events also plays a role.
SUMMARYAND LIMITATIONS
We summarize the AREA model by discussing how it relates to
the three principles of affective adaptation we reviewed earlier:
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we suggest that a key antagonistic process has been over-
looked—namely the process of explanation and understanding,
which serves to dampen emotional reactions. Whether the pri-
mary function of explanation/understanding is to regulate
emotional responses, or whether it serves other functions (e.g.,
increasing people’s ability to predict and control the future), is
an open question. Nonetheless, explanation is vital to affective
attenuation.Second,theAREAmodelincorporates andextends
theattentionprincipleofemotionaladaptationbyspecifyingthe
conditions under which people’s attention will be drawn to
events (i.e., when the events are self-relevant but poorly un-
derstood) and the conditions under which people no longer at-
tend to events (when they succeed in explaining the event or
decide that it is no longer self-relevant).
The AREA model does not incorporate the reference-point
principle, which holds that people compare their current
experiences with a reference point that changes as the event
reoccurs.Instead,ourapproachshareswithnormtheorytheidea
that people do not necessarily come to their experiences with a
reference point in mind and that they do not compare each
experience with the past (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Rather,
people attempt to make sense of events as best they can, which
might involve comparing them with their past experiences, but
couldalsoinvolvecomparingthemwithhypotheticalalternative
scenarios or assimilating the event into their knowledge struc-
tures. As norm theory suggests, people who succeed in making
sense of an event will view the event as ‘‘normal’’ and have little
emotional reaction to it. If people cannot easily explain a self-
relevant event, they will experience an emotional reaction. The
AREA model extends norm theory by discussing what happens
next. When people ﬁnd an event to be self-relevant but difﬁcult
to understand and experience an emotional reaction, what de-
termines the time course of that reaction? As we have seen,
affectiveadaptationisafunctionofhowsuccessfulpeopleareat
reaching an understanding of the event (i.e., assimilating it to
their knowledge structures or accommodating their knowledge
structures to account for the event).
It is important to note the limitations of the AREA model. As
with any theory that posits the existence of nonconscious pro-
cessing, the model suffers from the inability to directly measure
these processes (i.e., the process of explanation and under-
standing). We have adopted the approach of all such theories,
namely ﬁnding ways to manipulate the proposed process and
making speciﬁc predictions about outcomes that can be ob-
served. We believe we have been successful in this (e.g., in our
studies ofthe pleasures of uncertainty), but it would be useful to
develop new assessments of the consequences of successful
versus unsuccessful attempts to understand emotional events.
Further, it is clear that there is more empirical support for some
partsofthe model(e.g., the roleofuncertainty inpositive affect)
than for others. For example, our hypothesis that self-relevant,
poorly understood events receive priority in attention is con-
sistentwiththeliterature,butmoredirecttestsofthishypothesis
are needed.
Nor can the AREA model explain all cases of affective adap-
tation. As noted earlier, for example, adaptation can result from
engaging inactivitiesthat distract peoplefrom a focal event and
produceopposingemotions.Bereavedpeoplemighthastentheir
recovery by meeting new friends and developing new hobbies
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and people who have had a bad day at
work might bury themselves in a good book. To the extent that
people can choose such distracting activities, they will adapt
faster to negative events than to positive events, because people
are typically more motivated to distract themselves from the
former than the latter. Sometimes engaging in new activities is
lessvoluntary (e.g.,people mustreturn toworkafter avacation),
leading to adaptation to both positive and negative experiences.
In addition, affect can be produced by low-level sensory re-
actions (e.g., to an unpleasant odor), and adaptation in such
cases can result from changes in the sensitivity of sensory re-
ceptors. For example, olfactory adaptation has been found in
organisms with limited central nervous systems, such as
Drosophila larvae (Dalton, 2000). But cognitive processes can
still inﬂuence sensory adaptation in human beings; one study
found that people’s expectations about the aversiveness of an
odor inﬂuenced the speed ofadaptationtoit (Dalton, 1996). The
extent to which the AREA model applies in such cases is an
openquestion.Forexample,wouldpeopleadaptmorequicklyto
an odor that is well-understood, such as the aroma of baking
cookies that one has just placed in the oven, than to the same
odor that is less well-understood, such as the aroma of baking
cookies coming from an adjacent ofﬁce at work?
These examples raise questions about the breadth of the
AREAmodelandwhatitmeansto‘‘explain’’or‘‘understand’’an
emotional event. We have used one rubric for a heterogeneous
setofcognitiveprocessesandaffectiveexperiences,anditmight
be argued that our deﬁnition of explanation covers too broad a
range of cognitive processes. We acknowledge this point and
agree that the precise nature of and limits of the explanation
process remain to be mapped. Nonetheless, we believe that an
advantage of the AREA model is bringing a wide array of phe-
nomena under one theoretical tent. For example, the model
helps explain why people adapt to some kinds of events more
quickly than they do to others and helps explain such diverse
phenomena as bereavement and the process of psychotherapy.
Further, we have identiﬁed a number of variables that facilitate
or impede the explanation of an event (e.g., novelty, surprise,
variability of an event, and uncertainty), allowing for empirical
tests ofthemodel. Themostimportantpoint,perhaps,isthatthe
model generates new, testable hypotheses, such as the pleasure
of uncertainty hypothesis and theories of cultural differences in
the intensity and duration of affective reactions. It is our hope
that the AREA model will stimulate research on these and other
important questions about why time ‘‘heals all wounds’’ and
‘‘dulls most pleasures.’’
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